Reflections on Meeting #2-I
Some thoughts on what I think is clear, and what isn't, in the material we were discussing yesterday.
As John emphasized, the labyrinth of the continuum appears in different forms in different periods of Leibniz's career. Next week we will be going back to some of his earliest speculations when he is just discovering the problems associated with the continuum. Yesterday we were discussing where Leibniz ends up in writings from the last two decades of his life (1695-1716). I agree with Hartz and Cover that in these works it is correct to see Leibniz as distinguishing three domains of being: the ideal, the phenomenal, and the fully real (or substantial), and that both of the latter two domains fall under the broader category of the actual.
A few comments on this. The ideal has no existence outside of the mind (ours or Gods). It consists of beings that are, in Leibniz's vocabulary, entia rationis (beings of reason), which include abstract objects (properties, relations, geometrical objects) and propositions.
All actuals are concrete or particular things for Leibniz. But these may be either entia per se (things which exist through themselves) or entia per aggregationem (things which exist by virtue of being aggregated from other things). About the latter we can say four things with confidence: (i) the reality of aggregated beings is derivative from that of the things from which they are aggregated: they exist by virtue of the prior existence of other things; (ii) if a given aggregated being is to be real at all, there cannot be an infinite regress of ontological dependence: for it to be real, its existence must be grounded in things that exist through themselves (i.e. substances); (iii) the existence of any aggregate presupposes prior things from which it is aggregated, but it also presupposes a certain relation among those things--the relation that allows us to denominate them as one thing (e.g. a herd, an army, etc.) rather than simply an unrelated plurality of things. But, according to Leibniz, all relations are ideal: to the extent that things are related, they are related for some mind or other (possibly only God's). Thus, it follows that anything that is an aggregate must also be a phenomenon, in that its existence is partially mind-dependent; (iv) unfortunately, Leibniz's use of the term phaenomenon is systematically ambiguous. Sometimes, he uses it in the familiar sense of the contents of perception; in this sense, it can designate a merely intentional object, which might or might not have a mind-independent existence ("the dagger I see before me"). But phaenomenon also has a second, specifically ontological meaning, whereby it refers to the second class of derivatively real beings: those whose existence is explained in terms of the prior existence of substances.
The most important upshot of the last distinction is this: When Leibniz describes physical things and their properties as "phenomenal," is he using this term in the first or the second sense? Is he conceiving of material things merely as intentional objects (objects of thought or perception)? Or is he using phaenomenon in its ontological sense, whereby something can be a phenomenon and also be an aggregate of substances?
One might object that I am here creating a false dichotomy, for on the account I gave of entia per aggregationem, aggregates can only exist as countable objects (this army, this stone) insofar as their constituents are represented as forming one thing. Prior to an act of mind, we have many substances but no one aggregate. So, an aggregate is necessarily an object of thought or perception and the distinction between the two senses of phaenomenon collapses.
This, though, cannot be the whole story. For Leibniz surely wants to draw a distinction between the mere appearance of a body and an actual or existing body. In the latter case, even if the act of denominating it as one thing presupposes the involvement of the mind (wherein many things are represented as one), still, what we are picking out--the extramental existence--is (or "is constituted from") something real and not a merely intentional object.
One final quirk in all this is that, according to Leibniz, most of a body's physical properties turn out to be merely phenomenal, in the sense that they are not properties of extra-mental things at all. Thus, Leibniz extends what mechanists say about "secondary qualities" to "primary qualities" (size, shape, motion) as well. While there may be some way of understanding these qualities as being determined by the properties of substances, they are not themselves properties of substances (compare what a mechanist will say about red or sweet). At the same time, Leibniz claims that some properties of matter, its active and passive forces, can be understood as properties of substance. So, when we designate something as a body and describe its dynamic properties, we are indeed talking, at least indirectly, about the properties of real, substantial things.
I'll continue with some remarks on the labyrinth itself in my next post.
As John emphasized, the labyrinth of the continuum appears in different forms in different periods of Leibniz's career. Next week we will be going back to some of his earliest speculations when he is just discovering the problems associated with the continuum. Yesterday we were discussing where Leibniz ends up in writings from the last two decades of his life (1695-1716). I agree with Hartz and Cover that in these works it is correct to see Leibniz as distinguishing three domains of being: the ideal, the phenomenal, and the fully real (or substantial), and that both of the latter two domains fall under the broader category of the actual.
A few comments on this. The ideal has no existence outside of the mind (ours or Gods). It consists of beings that are, in Leibniz's vocabulary, entia rationis (beings of reason), which include abstract objects (properties, relations, geometrical objects) and propositions.
All actuals are concrete or particular things for Leibniz. But these may be either entia per se (things which exist through themselves) or entia per aggregationem (things which exist by virtue of being aggregated from other things). About the latter we can say four things with confidence: (i) the reality of aggregated beings is derivative from that of the things from which they are aggregated: they exist by virtue of the prior existence of other things; (ii) if a given aggregated being is to be real at all, there cannot be an infinite regress of ontological dependence: for it to be real, its existence must be grounded in things that exist through themselves (i.e. substances); (iii) the existence of any aggregate presupposes prior things from which it is aggregated, but it also presupposes a certain relation among those things--the relation that allows us to denominate them as one thing (e.g. a herd, an army, etc.) rather than simply an unrelated plurality of things. But, according to Leibniz, all relations are ideal: to the extent that things are related, they are related for some mind or other (possibly only God's). Thus, it follows that anything that is an aggregate must also be a phenomenon, in that its existence is partially mind-dependent; (iv) unfortunately, Leibniz's use of the term phaenomenon is systematically ambiguous. Sometimes, he uses it in the familiar sense of the contents of perception; in this sense, it can designate a merely intentional object, which might or might not have a mind-independent existence ("the dagger I see before me"). But phaenomenon also has a second, specifically ontological meaning, whereby it refers to the second class of derivatively real beings: those whose existence is explained in terms of the prior existence of substances.
The most important upshot of the last distinction is this: When Leibniz describes physical things and their properties as "phenomenal," is he using this term in the first or the second sense? Is he conceiving of material things merely as intentional objects (objects of thought or perception)? Or is he using phaenomenon in its ontological sense, whereby something can be a phenomenon and also be an aggregate of substances?
One might object that I am here creating a false dichotomy, for on the account I gave of entia per aggregationem, aggregates can only exist as countable objects (this army, this stone) insofar as their constituents are represented as forming one thing. Prior to an act of mind, we have many substances but no one aggregate. So, an aggregate is necessarily an object of thought or perception and the distinction between the two senses of phaenomenon collapses.
This, though, cannot be the whole story. For Leibniz surely wants to draw a distinction between the mere appearance of a body and an actual or existing body. In the latter case, even if the act of denominating it as one thing presupposes the involvement of the mind (wherein many things are represented as one), still, what we are picking out--the extramental existence--is (or "is constituted from") something real and not a merely intentional object.
One final quirk in all this is that, according to Leibniz, most of a body's physical properties turn out to be merely phenomenal, in the sense that they are not properties of extra-mental things at all. Thus, Leibniz extends what mechanists say about "secondary qualities" to "primary qualities" (size, shape, motion) as well. While there may be some way of understanding these qualities as being determined by the properties of substances, they are not themselves properties of substances (compare what a mechanist will say about red or sweet). At the same time, Leibniz claims that some properties of matter, its active and passive forces, can be understood as properties of substance. So, when we designate something as a body and describe its dynamic properties, we are indeed talking, at least indirectly, about the properties of real, substantial things.
I'll continue with some remarks on the labyrinth itself in my next post.
posted by Don at 11:58 AM
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